Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship

2007

Medicine and Public Health: Crossing Legal
Boundaries
Wendy K. Mariner
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Wendy K. Mariner, Medicine and Public Health: Crossing Legal Boundaries, 10 Journal of Health Care Law and Policy 121 (2007).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/359

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly
Commons at Boston University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
WORKING PAPER SERIES, PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY
WORKING PAPER NO. 07-13

MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH:
CROSSING LEGAL BOUNDARIES
WENDY K. MARINER

Copyright 2007 WK Mariner
published in the JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY, Vol. 10, p. 121 (2007)

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Boston University School of Law Working Paper Series Index:
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2007.html
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:

MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH:
CROSSING LEGAL BOUNDARIES
WENDY K. MARINER*
INTRODUCTION
On December 14, 2005, the New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene adopted a new diabetes surveillance program. The new health code
regulations require medical laboratories to submit to the Health Department the
results of every patient’s blood sugar tests, together with the patient’s name, date of
birth, address, physician, and other information.1 The report does not require the
patient’s consent. The Health Department will review the reports to see which
patients are not controlling their blood sugar levels and will contact the physician,
or sometimes the patient, to encourage the patient to change his or her behavior by
losing weight, eating better, taking medication, and seeing a physician more often.
Is this an innovative way to improve the health of several hundred thousand New
Yorkers, a presumptuous invasion of privacy, or usurpation of the physician’s role?
Dr. Thomas R. Frieden, Commissioner of the New York City Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene, is enthusiastic about the new program, hoping it will
reduce the number of people in New York City with uncontrolled diabetes,
particularly Type 2 diabetes.2 Critics, on the other hand, worry that the program

Copyright © 2007 by Wendy K. Mariner.
* Professor of Health Law, Bioethics and Human Rights, Boston University School of Public Health;
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law (Boston, MA); Professor of Socio-Medical Sciences
and Community Medicine, Boston University School of Medicine (Boston, MA). This article is adapted
from the author’s lecture at the Association of American Law Schools’ Annual Meeting in Washington,
D.C., Empirical Scholarship: What Should We Study and How Should We Study It?, which was cosponsored by the AALS Sections on Law, Medicine and Health Care; Socio-Economics; and Torts and
Compensation Systems, entitled Public Health in Law (January 2006).
1. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., 24 HEALTH CODE §§ 13.03-.04 (2006). See infra note 6 for the text of
these regulations, which took effect on January 15, 2006.
2. David B. Caruso, NYC Proposes Tracking Diabetics, Raising Privacy Fears: Critics Say
Consent Must Be Asked Before Collecting Data to Help Patients, THE STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK, NJ),
July 26, 2005, at 28. Type 2 diabetes arises, typically in adulthood, from a body’s inability to use insulin
properly and is believed to result from excess body weight and physical inactivity. World Health Org.,
Fact Sheet No. 312, Diabetes (2006), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs312/en/index.html
[hereinafter Fact Sheet No. 312]. It accounts for about ninety percent of diabetes cases worldwide. Id.
Type 1 diabetes is a genetic condition in which the pancreas fails to produce insulin; it is usually
diagnosed in childhood and typically well-controlled. Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Type 1 Diabetes,
http://www.diabetes.org/type-1-diabetes.jsp (last visited Nov. 10, 2006); Lucile Packard Children’s
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invades personal privacy.3 Physicians worry that the City will tell them how to treat
their patients. Critics may also be concerned that what begins as a benevolent effort
to encourage better medical care may mutate into requiring compliance with a
medical regimen as a condition for Medicaid eligibility, private health insurance,
public or private employment, or even a general duty to stay healthy.4 A
disproportionate number of diabetics in New York City are Medicaid beneficiaries
or disadvantaged minorities and the City would benefit financially from any
reduction in the cost of their care.5 If the City or state can monitor a chronic
condition like diabetes, why not heart disease, cancers, asthma, hypertension, low
back pain, and other chronic conditions?
This article examines these different perspectives on disease reporting and the
legal arguments for them. Part I describes the New York City diabetes blood sugar
test results reporting program and reasons for its adoption. Part II critiques the
justifications put forth for the program, finding that they fail to satisfy basic legal
principles governing patient autonomy and privacy. Part III places the program in
the broader context of the evolution of public health to encompass not merely
communicable diseases and environmental hazards, but, increasingly, personal
behaviors and the medical treatment of chronic conditions. Part III considers
whether public health is being privatized or good health is being made a public
duty. In either case, the boundary between the fields of medicine and public health
is blurring, with important and perhaps ominous implications for the legal rights
and duties of individuals, especially patients and physicians. This article concludes

Hosp.,
Diabetes
&
Other
Endocrine
and
Metabolic
Disorders,
http://www.lpch.org/DiseaseHealthInfo/HealthLibrary/diabetes/type1.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
A third form of diabetes, gestational diabetes, in which placental hormones block insulin’s effect in
pregnancy, affects about four percent of pregnant women, but normally disappears after delivery. Am.
Diabetes Ass’n, Gestational Diabetes, http://www.diabetes.org/gestational-diabetes.jsp (last visited
Nov. 10, 2006). For a layperson’s description of each type of diabetes, see Am. Diabetes Ass’n, All
About Diabetes, http://www.diabetes.org/about-diabetes.jsp (last visited Nov. 10, 2006); Fact Sheet No.
312, supra.
3. E.g., Rob Stein, New York City Starts to Monitor Diabetics, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2006, at A3
(quoting opponents who describe the plan as “a recipe for invasion of privacy” and who fear the
“information could be taken out of the data bank and disseminated to people or places [the diabetic
doesn’t] necessarily want it to be disseminated”); David B. Caruso, New York Pushes Plan to Track
Diabetes, HOUSTON CHRON., July 26, 2005, at A7 (quoting a representative of health care groups
concerned with privacy who argued that “[Diabetes] isn’t smallpox. The State, or the city in this case,
does not have a compelling interest in the health of an individual that overrides that individual’s right to
privacy.”).
4. See infra Part III.
5. RICHARD ALBA & DAVID STROGATZ, THE QUIET CRISIS: MINORITY-MAJORITY DISPARITIES
FOR
DIABETES
IN
UPSTATE
NEW
YORK
CITIES
(2006),
available
at
http://www.albany.edu/news/pdf_files/UAlbany_CEMHD_MinorityMajority_Diabetes_UpstateNY_Cities.pdf. Across the United States, an estimated 10% of non-Hispanic
blacks have diagnosed diabetes, compared with 5.6% of non-Hispanic whites, 6.5% of MexicanAmericans, and 15.8% of all Americans age 65 and older. Catherine C. Cowie et al., Prevalence of
Diabetes and Impaired Fasting Glucose in Adults in the U.S. Population: National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey 1999-2002, 29 DIABETES CARE 1263, 1265 tbl.1 (2006).
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that the general goal of improving public health is too vague and malleable a
concept to justify depriving individuals of their personal privacy. A far more
precise and principled concept of public health threat is necessary to justify
involuntary reporting of personally identifiable medical information and
compliance with medical recommendations.
Chronic disease registries raise epistemological questions about
distinguishing professional roles and determining whether public health is
becoming medicalized or overtaking the role of physicians. This is an intriguing
debate, but I am interested instead in the effect of this trend on the law governing
patients and, more broadly, fundamental principles of autonomy and privacy. It
hardly matters whether people call themselves medical or public health
practitioners. What law they follow does matter. Where public health programs
seek to override legal principles protecting patient autonomy and privacy, it matters
very much what the law is.
I.

THE NEW YORK CITY HEMOGLOBIN A1C REGISTRY

The New York City Board of Health amended its Health Code in December
2005 to require the reporting of blood sugar (Hemoglobin A1C) test results,
together with the patient’s name, address, and date of birth.6 The Health

6. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., 24 HEALTH CODE §§ 13.03-.04 (2006). The ordinance, adopted by the
New York City Board of Health on December 14, 2005, amends the New York City Health Code to
provide the following:
§ 13.04. Reporting of Hemoglobin A1C.
(a) All clinical laboratories, as defined under §13.01 of this Article, that report laboratory test results
electronically to the Department and which use a file up-load method, shall electronically report to the
Department all laboratory results for Hemoglobin A1C tests, as defined in subsection (b) of this section,
within 24 hours.
(b) The “Hemoglobin A1C” laboratory test represents an index of blood glucose control measuring
average blood sugar over the past 90 days, and shall mean the following for the purposes of this section:
HgbA1c; HgbA1c by HPLC; HbA1c; Glycohemoglobin A1C; Gycolhaemoglobin; Glycohemoglobin;
Glycated Hgb; Glyco-Hb; GHb; Ghb. As defined in this section, “Hemoglobin A1C” shall not mean the
following: Hgb; Hemoglobin; Hb; Hb without reference to glycated or glycosylated or A1C; or
Glycohemoglobin total.
(c) Reports required by subsection (a) shall contain the information required in Section 13.03 (a)(1)
through (6) of this Article.
(d) Hemoglobin A1C test results and other identifying information reported to the department pursuant
to this section shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person other than the individual
who is the subject of the report or to such person’s treating medical providers. If the subject of the report
is a minor, information can be disclosed to the subject’s parent or legal guardian.
The ordinance requires clinical laboratories to report the following identification information:
§ 13.03. Report of positive findings.
(a) The director of a clinical laboratory shall report to the Department within 24 hours all laboratory
findings which indicate the presumptive presence of any disease required to be reported by §11.03 of
this Code. Reports shall state the particulars required by §11.05 and shall include:
(1) The full name of the person from whom the specimen was taken, the date of birth and address of
such person.
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Department’s reason for adopting the new program was set forth in its preface to
the new ordinance:
Diabetes, a life-long disease, has recently become epidemic in New
York City (NYC) and is a major public health problem. The prevalence
of diabetes in NYC has doubled in the past ten years. The NYC 2003
Community Health Survey (CHS) estimates that 9% (530,000) of adult
New Yorkers and 20% of adults over 65 have diagnosed diabetes.
People may have diabetes an average of 4-7 years before being
diagnosed, and it is estimated that another 265,000 may have diabetes
and not yet know it. Diabetes is now the fourth leading cause of death in
New York City, moving up from 6th in 2002. This epidemic condition
requires similar or greater urgency in public health response to that
traditionally accorded to infectious disease monitoring and control.7
The program was certainly inspired by a desire to improve health and to
postpone early deaths. Diabetes is a serious problem for a growing number of
people.8 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that
almost fifteen million Americans—five percent of the population—had diabetes in
2004,9 approximately twice the number of cases on record twenty years ago.10

(2) The medical record number if known, identification number or code assigned to the person, if any,
and other personal identifiers as may be required by the Department.
(3) The name and address of the physician or other authorized person or clinical laboratory who
submitted the specimen.
(4) The name and address of the clinical laboratory which performed the test.
(5) The date the test or tests results were first available.
(6) The name(s) of test or tests performed.
7. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, BD. OF HEALTH, NEW YORK CITY, NOTICE OF
ADOPTION TO AMEND ARTICLE 13 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE 1 (2005), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-a1c.pdf [hereinafter NOTICE OF
ADOPTION].
8. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Diabetes Public Health Resource, Data & Trends
[hereinafter
Diabetes
Data
&
Trends],
http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/statistics/prev/national/figpersons.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
Diabetes is diagnosed when fasting blood levels of glucose (sugar) are at least 126 mg/dl. Am. Diabetes
Ass’n, All About Diabetes, http://www.diabetes.org/about-diabetes.jsp (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
9. U.S. Census Bureau, Table 1: Annual Estimates for the United States and States, and for Puerto
Rico:
April
1,
2000
to
July
1,
2004
(2004),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2004-01.pdf. The total U.S. population has grown
24% from 238,948,000 in 1985 to 296,410,404 in 2005. U.S. Census Bureau, Monthly Estimates of the
United States Population: April 1, 1980 to July 1, 1999, with Short-Term Projections to November 1,
2000 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/nat-total.txt; U.S. Census
Bureau, Table 1: Annual Estimates of the Population by Sex and Five-Year Age Groups for the United
States:
April
1,
2000
to
July
1,
2005,
(2006),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2005/NC-EST2005-01.xls. The Census Bureau
estimates that 36,790,114 Americans are sixty-five years of age or over. Id.
10. Diabetes Data & Trends, supra note 8 (reporting that 14.7 million Americans had diagnosed
diabetes in 2004). In 1982, an estimated six million people—2.4% of the population—had diabetes. U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIABETES IN THE 1980’S: CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE, REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL DIABETES ADVISORY BOARD 1 (1982). Not all the individuals included in the
estimate have been diagnosed with diabetes for a variety of reasons, such as lack of access to medical
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Furthermore, while diabetes was the sixth most common cause of death in the
United States in 2003, it was the fourth most common cause of death in New York
City.11
Beyond the commendable goal of improving health, taking action against
diabetes may be financially necessary. The rise in diabetes appears to parallel rising
pharmaceutical prices and possible reductions in state Medicaid budgets. The New
York City Health Department says that in “New York State, 31% of diabetic
patients in commercial managed care and 42% in Medicaid Managed Care have an
A1C > 9.0%,” which is higher than the recommended level of less than 7 percent.12
The Health Department further argues that “tight blood sugar control” can reduce
“by over 25%” the small blood vessel complications that lead to eye disease,
kidney complications and peripheral nerve disorders.13 Thus, the Health
Department concludes, “[k]eeping the average blood sugar (A1C) under 7.0% can
prevent many diabetes-related complications and deaths.”14

care. Estimates may vary with how diabetes is measured. More recently, researchers at the National
Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases estimated that 6.5% of Americans have been
diagnosed with diabetes and another 2.8% are undiagnosed. Cowie et al., supra note 5, at 1265 tbls.1 &
2. Another 26% had higher than normal blood sugar levels, but not high enough to qualify as diabetes.
Id. at 1266.
11. Arialdi M. Miniño et al., Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2004, 54 NAT’L. VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 4
tbl.B (2006), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_19.pdf; Press Release, New York City
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Diabetes Is Now the Fourth Leading Cause of Death in New York
City (Dec. 22, 2004). Deaths from all causes in 2004 totaled 2,398,365, with heart disease accounting
for 654,092; cancers for 550,270; stroke for 150,147; respiratory disease for 123,884; unintentional
injuries for 108,694; and diabetes for 72,815 deaths. Miniño et al., supra, at 4 tbl.B. Age-adjusted death
rates for heart disease have been declining since 1980, for cancer since 1993, and for stroke since 1958.
Donna L. Hoyert et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2003, 54 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 8 (2006),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_13.pdf. Complicating the picture is the fact that
diabetes was (and still is) not always listed as a contributing or underlying cause of death, perhaps
because the frequent causes of death among people with diabetes are heart disease, stroke,
atherosclerosis, and renal disease. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Premature Mortality from
Diabetes Mellitus—Use of Sentinel Health Event Surveillance to Assess Causes, 35 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 711, 711 (1986) [hereinafter Premature Mortality from Diabetes]; Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, Premature Mortality in the United States: Public Health Issues in the
Use of Years of Potential Life Lost, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1S, 5S (Supp. 1986)
(critiquing statistical methods to reflect underlying diseases in tabulations of causes of death or years of
life lost).
12. NOTICE OF ADOPTION, supra note 7, at 2. Normal blood sugar levels in the general population
are typically less than 6% or less than 135 mg/dl. Robert Steinbrook, Facing the Diabetes Epidemic—
Mandatory Reporting of Glycosylated Hemoglobin Values in New York City, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED.
545, 546-47 (2006); see also The Mayo Clinic, Blood Sugar Tests: Understanding Your Results,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/blood-sugar/SA00102 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (noting that 100
mg/dl is the population’s normal blood sugar level). The A1C test measures the average level of
glycemia over the preceding two to three months. Steinbrook, supra, at 546. The American Diabetes
Association recommends such tests twice a year for patients in good condition and four times a year for
patients who have unstable blood sugar levels. Id.
13. NOTICE OF ADOPTION, supra note 7, at 2.
14. Id.
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This goal may prove difficult to achieve. As the Department acknowledges,
the CDC has found that “only 37% of US adults with diabetes have an A1C < 7%
and 20% have an A1C > 9%.”15 Moreover, blood sugar levels are not the only
measure of diabetes control. Patients are also encouraged to keep their blood
pressure and blood lipid levels under control.16 The question is whether lowering
one or even all of these measures—blood sugar, blood pressure, and blood lipids—
is sufficient to reduce the risk of heart disease, stroke, renal disease, or retinopathy
to normal levels.17 After all, a high level of any one of these is just the first of
several steps on the way to disease symptoms. Even if this is the right goal, many
patients find it difficult to achieve the target levels.18
Although New Yorkers may be doing especially poorly, most Americans do
not or cannot achieve the recommended levels of control. New York City’s
experiment has obvious implications for the rest of the country. On the one hand, if
New York City is successful in getting people to control their blood sugar, other

15. Id. (citing Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., National Health
and
Nutrition
Examination
Survey:
1999-2000,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/nhanes/nhanes99_00.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2006)).
16. Recommendations for treating diabetes Type 2 include exercising and following a diet, with or
without medications, to reduce “bad” cholesterol and hypertension; having regular eye examinations to
detect retinopathies; and paying attention to foot and other infections. Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Standards of
Medical Care in Diabetes, 28 DIABETES CARE S4, S12-S13, S19-S20 (Supp. 2005); Am. Heart Ass’n,
What’s
the
Difference
Between
LDL
and
HDL
Cholesterol?,
http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=180 (last visited Oct. 16, 2006) (explaining that
LDL cholesterol is “bad” and HDL cholesterol is “good”); see also European Diabetes Policy Group
1998, A Desktop Guide to Type 1 (Insulin-Dependent) Diabetes Mellitus, 16 DIABETIC MED. 253 (1999)
(outlining similar recommendations for the treatment and management of Type 1 diabetes). The
American Diabetes Association issues Clinical Practice Recommendations for physicians to use in
caring for people with diabetes. Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Standards of Medical Care in Diabetes—2006, 29
DIABETES CARE S4 (Supp. 2006). Blood or serum lipid control refers to blood tests for cholesterol, with
the target being serum LDL-cholesterol below 100 mg/dL and triglycerides below 150 mg/dL. Id. at
S10. Blood pressure control is defined as less than 130/80 mm Hg. Id.; see also F.D. Richard Hobbs,
Reducing Cardiovascular Risk in Diabetes: Beyond Glycemic and Blood Pressure Control, 110 INT’L J.
CARDIOLOGY 137, 137 (2006) (“Low-density lipoprotein cholesterol is the first priority for treatment [to
prevent cardiovascular disease], with a statin in adequate dosage as the first choice for pharmacological
therapy.”).
17. Patrick J. O’Connor, Setting Evidence-Based Priorities for Diabetes Care Improvement, 15
INT’L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 283, 283 (2003) (noting that “clinical trials have not yet proven
that HbA1c lowering significantly reduces the risk of heart attacks or strokes,” while “control of
hypertension, control of lipid disorders, and aspirin use substantially reduce cardiovascular morbidity or
mortality in those with diabetes”).
18. There is extensive literature on educating patients about managing their diabetes in order to
prevent serious disease, much of which attests to a need to maintain long-term contact with patients to
encourage and support difficult behavior changes. See, e.g., K. M. Knight et al., The Diabetes Educator:
Trying Hard, But Must Concentrate More on Behaviour, 23 DIABETIC MED. 485, 495-96 (2006)
(reviewing educational studies and noting that there is little empirical support for the widespread
assumption that transferring knowledge will improve health outcomes, that knowledge may be
“necessary” but not “sufficient” for behavior change, that “single interventions, cognitive or behavioral,
produce disappointing results,” and that “interventions to change [complex human] behavior need to
reflect that complexity”).
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jurisdictions may follow suit. On the other hand, if controlling blood sugar alone is
not sufficient to significantly reduce the risk of serious disease, it is not clear how
much will have been gained.
The possible benefits of the program may be contrasted with its possible
costs. The cost of diabetes care has long been a concern.19 Routine expenses
include physician visits, drugs, insulin, blood testing equipment, and other supplies
that are relatively inexpensive, but may nevertheless pose problems for low-income
patients. These costs may increase if patients see physicians more frequently or
require additional medication and monitoring. Major expenses are concentrated in
hospitalizations for heart disease, stroke, kidney failure, and foot problems, which
tend to appear after many years with diabetes.20 Intangible costs of diabetes include
loss of productivity from an acute episode of illness or chronic disability, as well as
pain and inconvenience.21 Nevertheless, a successful program could enable more
patients to live longer with fewer disabilities, reducing productivity losses.22
The New York City program is modeled after an experiment being conducted
in Vermont.23 Researchers created a study—a randomized controlled trial funded

19. World
Health
Org.,
Diabetes:
The
Cost
of
Diabetes
(2003),
http://www.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/gs_diabetes.pdf (estimating that, in 2000, 177 million people
worldwide had diabetes); Can. Diabetes Ass’n, The Prevalence and Costs of Diabetes (2006),
http://www.diabetes.ca/files/prevalence-and-costs.pdf (confirming the WHO estimate, and adding that
“[b]y 2025, this figure will top 300 million”); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Study Shows
Sharp
Rise
in
the
Cost
of
Diabetes
Nationwide
(2003),
http://www.dhhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20030227a.html (reporting that the direct medical costs of
diabetes care in the United States rose from $44 billion in 1997 to approximately $92 billion in 2002);
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Studies on the Cost of Diabetes (1998),
http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/costs/appendices.htm (summarizing various studies on the cost of
diabetes, including the 1997 Am. Diabetes Ass’n study, which estimated the direct cost of diabetes as
$44 billion).
20. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASES: INVESTING
WISELY IN HEALTH 1 (2003), available at http://healthierus.gov/steps/summit/prevportfolio/DiabetesHHS.pdf.
21. Loss of productivity was estimated at $54 billion in the U.S. in 1997, suggesting that the cost of
care could offset productivity losses to an appreciable degree. Id.
22. The program may have financial value for the health department, regardless of any savings in
patient care costs. It may provide the department with a rationale for preserving or increasing its budget
and staff at a time when state and local funding is tight. Federal financial support for both research and
prevention have begun to decline. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Budget for the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (2006), www.cdc.gov/fmo/PDFs/FY06FundFunctAreaTable.pdf; Nat’l
Insts. of Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Estimates of Funding for Various Diseases,
Conditions, Research Areas, http://www.nih.gov/news/fundingresearchareas.pdf (last visited Mar. 4,
2007); cf. Ian Urbina, Cost and Effect: Rising Diabetes Threat Meets a Falling Budget, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 2006, at A1 (describing how treatment and research programs are being cut for lack of
funding).
23. NOTICE OF ADOPTION, supra note 7, at 2. The NYC Health Department states that the Vermont
Diabetes Information System offers an example of a similarly promising approach, without noting that
the Vermont program is a research study conducted with the consent of patients who do not object to
their enrollment as research subjects. Id.; see Charles D. MacLean et al., The Vermont Diabetes
Information System (VDIS): Study Design and Subject Recruitment for a Cluster Randomized Trial of a
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by a grant from the National Institutes of Health—to test an information system,
the Vermont Diabetes Information System (VDIS), for physicians and their
patients.24 Physicians and patients were invited to become research subjects and
only those patients who did not object were enrolled.25 The study collects the
results of multiple tests, such as blood sugar, lipids, cholesterol, and results of eye
exams, and sends physicians’ recommendations for particular treatment options for
each patient.26 It might be thought of as a computer-based diabetes medical
treatment protocol, coupled with an algorithm that applies the protocol to
individual test results.
The VDIS costs about $1 per patient per month.27 If New York City’s system
cost the same, it could require at least $12-24 million a year to operate. The
program anticipates receiving between one and two million test results annually.28
The City would therefore have to save at least that amount, perhaps in Medicaid
expenditures, to make the program cost-neutral.
The New York City Health Department’s diabetes program is both narrower
and broader than the VDIS. It is narrower because it is limited to obtaining only
A1C test results—not all information needed for diabetes treatment decisions—
which it will enter into a new diabetes registry, the New York City Hemoglobin
A1C Registry. It plans to “report a roster of patients to clinicians, stratified by
patient A1C levels, highlighting patients under poor control (e.g., A1C > 9.0%)
who may need intensified follow-up and therapy.”29 It is broader than the VDIS
study because it is not limited to providing treatment protocol information to
physicians and patients. The Health Department plans to use the data “for public
health surveillance and monitoring of trends of blood sugar control in people with
diabetes.”30 Specifically, it will “[p]lan programs in the Diabetes Prevention and
Control Program” and “[m]easure outcomes of diabetes care.”31

Decision Support System in a Regional Sample of Primary Care Practices, 1 CLINICAL TRIALS 532,
536, 538 (2004).
24. Charles D. MacLean et al., Diabetes Decision Support: Initial Experience with the Vermont
Diabetes Information System, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 593, 595 (2006). Final results of that ongoing
study are not yet available. Id. at 594. The study is supported by the National Institute of Diabetes and
Digestive and Kidney Diseases, id. at 595, which is one of the National Institutes of Health. Nat’l Insts.
of Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Institutes, Centers & Offices, http://www.nih.gov/icd
(last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
25. MacLean et al., supra note 23, at 535-36, 538.
26. Id. at 533-34, 537.
27. MacLean et al., supra note 24, at 594.
28. NOTICE OF ADOPTION, supra note 7, at 1-2.
29. Id. at 2.
30. Id. The proposed ordinance received little public attention. Id. at 1 (stating that the Department
received 31 written comments and 10 individuals testified at its Aug. 16, 2005 public hearing). Even so,
some people objected to having their personally identifiable test results sent to the Health Department.
Stein, supra note 3, at A3. The Health Department responded by allowing individuals to opt out of being
contacted directly by the Health Department, but still requires that the person’s A1C test results be
reported to the Department. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, New York City A1C Registry: “Do Not
Contact” Request (2006), available at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/diabetes/diabetes-
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The next part of this article considers whether these goals justify the
compulsory reporting of identifiable patient information, and whether they could be
achieved equally well without requiring identifiable data.
II.

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE NEW YORK CITY DIABETES REPORTING PROGRAM

There are at least three arguments that New York City does not have the legal
authority to adopt or implement its diabetes reporting program. The first is that the
Health Department’s regulatory authority over clinical laboratories does not include
the power to require the reporting of personally identifiable medical information.
The second is that neither the State nor the City of New York has the power to
require the reporting of such information in the absence of a credible threat posed
by the patients whose information is reported to the health or safety of other people.
The third is that when the department collects and uses this identifiable
information, it is engaged in research with human subjects that requires the
patient’s consent. However, as will be discussed in this part, it is possible for the
Health Department to acquire information relevant to its role without insisting upon
compulsory reporting of identifiable information.
A.

New York City’s Regulatory Authority

The New York City Health Department cited its authority to regulate clinical
laboratories and to supervise the reporting and control of chronic diseases as the
legal foundation for its diabetes program.32 The New York City Charter authorizes
the city health department to “analyze, evaluate, supervise and regulate clinical
laboratories, blood banks, and related facilities providing medical and health
services and services ancillary thereto.”33 The New York City Board of Health has

a1coptout-form.pdf. Ironically, a person who does not want to be contacted must submit to the Health
Department a “contact information” form with the person’s name, date of birth, address, and phone
number. Id.
31. NOTICE OF ADOPTION, supra note 7, at 2.
32. Id. at 1. New York City is governed by a Charter, which creates a Department of Health with
the powers of a local health department and a Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene as its head.
The Charter grants the department “jurisdiction to regulate all matters affecting health in the city of New
York and to perform all those functions and operations performed by the city that relate to the health of
the people of the city, including but not limited to the mental health, mental retardation, alcoholism and
substance abuse-related needs of the people of the city.” N.Y. CITY, N.Y., N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 22 §§
551, 556 (2005).
33. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 22, § 556(c)(4). This subsection is part of a list of twelve powers for
the “supervision of public health” that includes supervising the registration of births and deaths; the
reporting of communicable and chronic diseases and conditions hazardous to life and health; the
abatement of nuisances; providing services and facilities for the mentally disabled; inspecting hospitals,
clinics, nursing homes, clinical laboratories, and blood banks; inspecting and investigating service
providers for the mentally disabled; regulating public health aspects of the water supply, sewage
disposal, and water pollution; regulating production and distribution of milk and milk products;
regulating the food and drug supply of the city; regulating the disposal of human remains; regulating the
public health aspects of ionizing radiation, the handling of radioactive waste and radioactive materials;
and making rules covering the services of mental health providers. Id. § 556(c)(1)-(12). The New York
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the authority to amend, add, or repeal provisions of the city health code, and to
“confer additional powers on the department not inconsistent with the constitution,
laws of this state or this charter.”34 However, the Board of Health may not change
the health code beyond the “matters and subjects to which the power and authority
of the department extends.”35
It is unlikely that the power to “regulate clinical laboratories” includes or
even implies the power to prescribe mandatory reporting of specific identifiable
information about patients.36 Certainly the State, and here the City, can regulate
facilities like clinical laboratories with respect to their adherence to sanitation and
similar standards. Laboratory regulation historically has been limited to requiring
licensure conditioned on meeting standards for the quality of the building,
equipment, ownership, and its personnel, and sometimes by setting quality
standards for tests performed by a laboratory.37 The power to regulate hospitals has
never been considered to include the power to require hospitals to routinely report
identifiable information about their patients directly to the health department that
licenses the facility.38 Such reporting has historically been authorized pursuant to
an independent statute or regulation.
A more promising source of authority might be the power in Section
556(c)(2) of the Charter to “supervise the reporting and control of communicable
and chronic diseases and conditions hazardous to life and health.”39 This provision
is open to interpretation. On the one hand, it might be read broadly to imply the
power to require the reporting of any specific disease or condition. On the other
hand, the power to supervise reporting does not necessarily include the power to
require reporting; it might be limited simply to ensuring the proper collection and
storage of reports that are authorized or required by other legislation. This
provision may be an example of the typically general language used in health
legislation; the range of health concerns and possible responses are so varied that
detailed rules would be impractical in the text of a general delegation of authority.
Such language is broad enough, for example, to cover requiring restaurants to
observe standards of hygiene and sanitation and requiring industry to dispose of

City Administrative Code does not contain any provisions governing laboratories or hospitals. It does
contain one section requiring the commissioner to prevent a communicable disease from spreading from
one part of the City to another and to forbid communication with the house or family of a person
infected with a communicable disease. N.Y. CITY, N.Y, ADMIN. CODE ch. 1, § 17-104 (2005).
34. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 22, § 558(b).
35. Id. § 558(c).
36. Id. § 556(c)(4); see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000 & Supp. 2006). The Anti-Referral Statute (Stark) applies to
all designated health services including clinical laboratories. Id. The statute prohibits all referrals for the
provision of designated health services and all claims for federal reimbursement for such services
furnished pursuant to a referral if the physician has a financial relationship with the entity. Id.
38. Health departments often require hospitals to report instances of unexpected patient injury or
death and to allow the department to investigate particular circumstances as part of its power to monitor
the quality of care. E.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-l (McKinney 2002).
39. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 22, § 556(c)(2).
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hazardous waste safely. However, the substance of the rules would be subject to
scrutiny for compliance with constitutional and state requirements. Interpreting
Section 556(c)(2) to provide a blanket authorization for imposing any and all
standards of conduct on clinical laboratories, much less individual residents, would
raise significant constitutional questions, as discussed in the next subpart.40
For these reasons, the idea that the power to supervise the reporting and
control of communicable and chronic diseases includes the power to obtain
identifiable personal information without the knowledge or consent of the
individual seems the least plausible interpretation and the one most vulnerable to
challenge. This conclusion is supported by the fact that failure to report would be a
criminal offense.41 The power to create crimes is not to be lightly inferred from
general language historically intended to regulate the quality of care and the
environment.
B.

Collecting Personally Identifiable Information for Public Health Purposes
1.

Possible Goals

The New York City Health Commissioner reportedly advocated the A1C
Registry on the ground that the Health Department, “should know how many New
Yorkers have diabetes that is badly out of control, where they are, and who cares
for them.”42 Certainly the Health Department has an interest in how many New
Yorkers have diabetes. Whether it has an interest in identifying each person is a
different question. The Health Department might claim a role in monitoring the
quality of care that physicians provide to their patients. Of course, the argument for
ensuring quality applies equally to all kinds of medical care, not just to blood sugar
levels of diabetic patients. This suggests that the Health Department is claiming the
power to receive reports about all diseases and conditions that physicians treat. If
the power is to be limited to A1C test results, there should be a reason that justifies
limiting the exercise of this power to that specific test or at least to diabetes.
Three reasons for limiting reporting to A1C tests might be considered. The
first is that diabetes is expensive to treat and the city needs to reduce its
expenditures for that treatment.43 Of course, the cost argument cannot be limited to
diabetes. It would apply to any expensive condition, such as heart disease, stroke,
cancer, liver disease, kidney failure, and serious injuries. Because this reasoning
could apply to so many other kinds of conditions, it does not offer a persuasive
principle for limiting reporting to A1C test results. A second possible reason is that

40. See infra notes 43-83 and accompanying text.
41. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 22, § 558(e) (“Any violation of the health code shall be treated and
punished as a misdemeanor.”).
42. Steinbrook, supra note 12, at 546.
43. Neil Osterweil, New York City Plans Diabetes Patient Tracking, MEDPAGE TODAY, July 26,
2005, http://www.medpagetoday.com/tbprint.cfm?tbid=1422.

132

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 10:121

diabetes affects a growing number of people whose lives could be significantly
improved with appropriate care.44 This is certainly a good reason for expanding
access to good quality care. But it does not explain the need for the Health
Department to create a registry of identifiable A1C test results.
The third and most likely explanation for the Registry lies in the expansion of
the concepts of both “epidemics” and “disease surveillance” among public health
practitioners, which encourages the notion that health departments are entitled to
personally identifiable health information about everyone in the state. To
laypersons, the word epidemic may bring to mind memories of SARS or the HIV
epidemic, or even history lessons about smallpox or plague.45 To many
epidemiologists and public health practitioners today, however, an epidemic is any
increase in the number of people with a particular disease or condition that is
higher than would be expected based on past experience.46 Thus, we read news
reports of an epidemic of obesity or breast cancer.47 Calling such conditions
“epidemics” may create a perception that people with chronic diseases should be
treated as though they have a contagious disease, using laws formerly reserved for
preventing epidemics of smallpox and similar contagious diseases.48 Historically,
state and local health departments required physicians to report cases of certain
communicable diseases so that the department could investigate the source of an

44. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
45. For good histories of epidemics see generally JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE
EPIC STORY OF THE DEADLIEST PLAGUE IN HISTORY (2004); MARILYN CHASE, THE BARBARY PLAGUE:
THE BLACK DEATH IN VICTORIAN SAN FRANCISCO (2003); HOWARD MARKEL, QUARANTINE! EAST
EUROPEAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS AND THE NEW YORK CITY EPIDEMICS OF 1892 (1997).
46. Michael B. Gregg, A Walk-Through Exercise: A Food-Borne Epidemic in Oswego County, New
York, in FIELD EPIDEMIOLOGY app. 413, 415 (Michael B. Gregg ed., 2d ed. 2002). An outbreak of
disease is a sudden increase in the number of cases of a disease beyond what is normally expected,
ordinarily in a particular locality. Richard C. Dicker, A Brief Review of the Basic Principles of
Epidemiology, in FIELD EPIDEMIOLOGY supra, at 22. An epidemic is a broader outbreak in a larger
geographic area. Id. However, some epidemiologists treat any outbreak as equivalent to an epidemic.
Gregg, supra, at 415. A pandemic is an epidemic that spreads to several countries. Dicker, supra, at 22.
47. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES NO. 894, OBESITY: PREVENTING
AND MANAGING THE GLOBAL EPIDEMIC 2 (2000) (describing obesity as “one of the most significant
contributors to ill health” and “a key risk factor in the natural history of other chronic and
noncommunicable diseases”); Katherine M. Flegal et al., Excess Deaths Associated With Underweight,
Overweight, and Obesity, 293 JAMA 1861, 1863-65 (2005) (estimating that approximately 112,000
deaths in 2000 were attributable to obesity and critiquing earlier methodologies in Ali H. Mokdad et al.,
Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291 JAMA 1238, 1240 (2004) (estimating about
400,000 deaths were attributed to poor diet and physical inactivity)); Ali H. Mokdad et al., Correction:
Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 293 JAMA 293, 293 (2005) (correcting errors in the
Mokdad et al. article cited in 291 JAMA, supra).
48. W. Wayt Gibbs, Obesity: An Overblown Epidemic?, 292 SCI. AM., 70, 72 (2005)
(acknowledging skeptics of the assertion by Dr. Julie L. Gerberding, Director of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, that “if you looked at any epidemic–whether it’s influenza or plague from the
Middle Ages–they are not as serious as the epidemic of obesity in terms of the health impact on our
country and our society”). Some commentators have called obesity the new frontier of public health law.
E.g., Michelle M. Mello et al., Obesity — The New Frontier of Public Health Law, 354 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2601, 2601 (2006).
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outbreak that could quickly spread infection to the public.49 A successful example
was the identification of the risks for AIDS in the early 1980s.50 More recent
examples include identifying the source of Toxic Shock Syndrome51 and
investigating fungal infections in the eyes of individuals who used a particular
Bausch & Lomb contact lens solution.52
Chronic diseases like diabetes are not infectious, of course, and cannot be
transmitted from person to person. They pose no imminent threat to the public.53
There is no need for the Health Department to investigate the source of a virus or
bacterium or to find people who might have been infected unknowingly.
With the decline in the prevalence of infectious diseases in the United States,
health departments have turned their attention to chronic diseases. The New York
City Health Commissioner made a strong appeal that public health efforts should
focus more on controlling chronic diseases.54 This makes sense to the extent that
health departments can contribute to reducing the burden of disease. For example,
heath departments can and do draw upon research to provide general information to
the public about how to reduce the risks of particular diseases55 and to the medical
profession about how to recognize or treat them.56 They can and do create or fund

49. Ruth L. Berkelman et al., Public Health Surveillance, in 2 OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUB.
HEALTH 759, 759-760 (Roger Detels et al. eds., 4th ed. 2002). Not all infections are contagious. An
infectious disease is any disease that can be transmitted to a human being by means of a virus,
bacterium, or parasite, which infects the person. DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MED. DICTIONARY 536 (30th
ed. 2003). A contagious disease is an infectious disease that can be transmitted from one person to
another person or via contact with an infected object like a blanket or towel. Id. at 531. Anthrax is
infectious, but not contagious, for example. Many statutes use the term “communicable” as a synonym
for contagious to emphasize the communicability of the disease and, by implication, to exclude
application to other infectious diseases. Id. at 530. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 331.304 (1999); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2(l) (McKinney 2002).
50. Berkelman et al., supra note 49, at 760 (“Even before . . . HIV was identified, surveillance data
contributed to identifying modes of transmission, population groups at risk for infection, and . . .
population groups not at risk for infection.”).
51. Richard Severo, Mystery of Toxic Shock Cases Is Unfolding at Disease Center, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1980, at 1.
52. Barnaby J. Feder, More Infections Tied to Bausch Contact Cleaner, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2006,
at C2. The investigations helped to determine which cases were linked to the product and which may
have been caused by poor hygiene. Id. Such investigations can determine whether it is appropriate to
recall a product or issue recommendations for patients.
53. See Lori B. Andrews, A Conceptual Framework for Genetic Policy: Comparing the Medical,
Public Health, and Fundamental Rights Models, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 271 (2001) (“[T]he mere fact
that a disease affects numerous people, and is thus a major societal concern, does not mean that it is a
public health threat.”).
54. Thomas R. Frieden, Editorial, Asleep at the Switch: Local Public Health and Chronic Disease,
94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2059, 2059 (2004) (“[N]oncommunicable diseases, which accounted for less
than 20% of U.S. deaths in 1900, now account for about 80% of deaths. Our local public health
infrastructure has not kept pace with this transition.”) (citations omitted).
55. See, e.g., N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, Communicable Disease: Tuberculosis (2004),
http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/communicable/tuberculosis/docs/fact_sheet.pdf.
56. See, e.g., Antonia C. Novello, Commissioner, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, Letter to Long Term
Care
Facility
Administrators
(Feb.
16,
2006),
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clinics that offer medical care to people without adequate or any health insurance
coverage.57 They can and do offer free or affordable voluntary programs where
people can obtain screening for various diseases or conditions, including high
cholesterol. These are all valuable functions for a health department. Yet, none of
them requires the collection of identifiable patient information.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that patients have an interest
in maintaining the privacy of their medical information, which is protected by the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.58 Compelled
disclosures of identifiable information require justification.59 The imminent threat
of an epidemic justified nineteenth and early twentieth century laws requiring
reporting of communicable diseases.60 In each case, reporting was justified because

http://www.health.state.ny.us/professionals/nursing_home_administrator/docs/dal_0603_guidelines_for_tuberculosis_control.pdf.
57. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Continuing Diabetes Care – Rhode Island, 1991, 43
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 798, 798-99 (1994) (describing the success of the Rhode Island
Diabetes Control Program, established in 1979, which distributes brochures for patients in clinics and
hospitals; makes recommendations to physicians for annual eye examinations and eye care for diabetes
patients; provides patient care in neighborhood health centers; and contributed to the finding that the
majority of people with diabetes in Rhode Island get eye care in accordance with recommendations, in
comparison with fewer than half of adults with diagnosed diabetes receiving appropriate eye care
nationally).
58. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900-01 (1992) (upholding abortion
reporting law without woman’s name or address as meeting the Danforth standard); Thornburgh v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-67 (1986) (striking down abortion reporting
law that could identify women and chill exercise of a constitutional right to terminate pregnancy); Nixon
v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (“One element of privacy has been characterized as
‘the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters . . . .’”) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 599, 606 (1977) (upholding the reporting of names and addresses of persons who have
obtained prescriptions for controlled substances)); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 80-81 (1976) (upholding abortion recordkeeping and reporting requirements “that are
reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient’s
confidentiality and privacy” where the state demonstrated that regulations met important health needs).
59. Federal courts of appeal have drawn some of the contours of the constitutional right to
information privacy. See, e.g., Sterling v. Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing
that sexual orientation is “entitled to privacy protection”); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 956 (7th Cir.
2000) (“[T]he right [of confidentiality] clearly covers medical records and communications.”); Bartnicki
v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he right not to have intimate facts concerning one’s
life disclosed without one’s consent” is “a venerable [right] whose constitutional significance we have
recognized in the past.” (citing Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 401-02 (3d Cir. 1999))); Doe v. City
of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Individuals who are infected with the HIV virus clearly
possess a constitutional right to privacy regarding their condition.”); Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348,
1351 (8th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that “highly personal medical or financial information” is confidential);
Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Financial information . . . is protected
by a right to privacy.”); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980)
(“[T]he full measure of the constitutional protection of the right to privacy has not yet been
delineated.”). But see Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 481 (6th Cir. 1999) (refusing to extend
Whalen, 429 U.S. 589, in the absence of specific language in the Constitution supporting “a general right
to nondisclosure of private information”); Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994).
60. See generally C.E.A. WINSLOW, THE LIFE OF HERMANN M. BIGGS: PHYSICIAN AND
STATESMAN OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH (1929). The first mandatory reporting law was enacted by
Michigan in 1893, although tavern owners in Rhode Island had been required to report customers with
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of the specific characteristics of the infectious agent—how easily it was
transmitted, the severity of the resulting disease, and the absence of an effective
vaccine to prevent infection or medicine to cure disease.61 Thus, tuberculosis,
which is an airborne bacillus transmitted by coughing or sneezing and can cause
serious, permanent illness, remains a reportable contagious disease.62 In contrast,
the common cold, which is similarly transmitted but rarely causes significant
illness, is not reportable.
In addition, laws authorized reporting the identity of the infected person when
that information was needed in order to permit an investigation of the source of the
infection, with the expectation that it could be removed or eliminated.63 Health
officials often needed to find out where the patient might have been exposed to
infection. For example, a report of salmonella often prompts an interview with the
patient and an investigation into the possibility of contaminated food at a particular
restaurant, so that the food can be disposed of or food handlers can be trained in
hygiene.64 In rare cases, it may be necessary to seek a court order to isolate the
patient who is unable or unwilling to avoid exposing other people to infection.65
Knowledge of personal identity is obviously necessary in such circumstances.
The New York City A1C Registry will not be used to contact anyone with a
contagious disease or investigate an outbreak of infection or control an epidemic in
the historical sense of the word. It does not fit the model of communicable disease

cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever to local officials since 1741. Id. at 138. New York first adopted a
reporting law for tuberculosis in 1897. Id. at 143-44.
61. JAMES A. TOBEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 133 (3d ed. 1947) (noting that the requirement that
diseases dangerous to health be reported has been upheld by courts on a number of occasions) (citing
Davis v. Rodman, 227 S.W. 612 (Ark. 1921); Smythe v. State, 86 So. 870 (Miss. 1921); City of Chicago
v. Craig, 172 Ill. App. 126 (1912); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 27 App. D.C. 259 (1906); People v.
Shurly, 91 N.W. 139 (Mich. 1902); Kansas City v. Baird, 92 Mo. App. 204 (1902); People v. Brady, 51
N.W. 537 (Mich. 1892); State v. Wordin, 56 Conn. 216 (1887); Robinson v. Hamilton, 14 N.W. 202
(Iowa 1882)).
62. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Tuberculosis Control Laws — United States, 1993:
Recommendations of the Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis, 42 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 3 (1993); Health-Cares.Net, What is Tuberculosis? (2005),
http://respiratory-lung.health-cares.net/tuberculosis.php.
63. See generally Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The “Names Debate”: The Case for
National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679, 695-98 (1998) (describing the
development of state AIDS reporting programs).
64. E.g., Roderick C. Jones et al., Salmonella Enterica Serotype Uganda Infection in New York City
and Chicago, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1665, 1665-66 (2004). Other types of state reporting
statutes have a similar goal of immediate investigation. For example, reports of injuries from firearms
and knives are used for the purpose of criminal investigations. E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation in
New York County, 779 N.E.2d 173, 177-78 (N.Y. 2002) (quashing subpoena for medical records from
twenty-three hospitals by Manhattan District Attorney seeking to identify assailant in a murder
investigation because it required the kind of medical determination of causation that patients are entitled
to expect will remain private). Reports of child and elder abuse are used to investigate whether the
person needs protection. See generally New York City Admin. for Children’s Servs., Prevent Child
Abuse and Neglect, http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/child_safety/prevent_abuse.shtml (last visited
Nov. 12, 2006).
65. See, e.g., City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
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reporting systems. Diabetes is a public health problem—in the broad sense that it
affects a large or growing number of people—but it does not pose any immediate
threat to the public. The Health Department’s intervention is not needed to tell
physicians, who order blood sugar tests for their patients and receive the results,
what physicians should already know. In the absence of any requirement that either
physicians or patients comply with Health Department medical regimen
recommendations, there is little reason to believe that the Registry will affect
physician treatment decisions or patient behavior.66 There appears to be no rational
relationship between the compulsory reporting of A1C test results and the goal of
reducing the risks of diabetes. Thus, if the regulation’s goal is to reduce diabetes,
the regulation is vulnerable to challenge as an impermissible violation of patients’
constitutional right to information privacy.
2.

Additional Uses of Data

The Board of Health’s notice of adoption of the reporting rule concludes that
“[t]he reporting of all A1C test results is important for program planning,
education, outreach, disease management and surveillance purposes.”67 The
preceding subpart argued that compulsory reporting of individually identifiable
information cannot be justified for purposes of disease management alone. The
other purposes quoted above offer even less support for the Registry, although the
reasoning behind that conclusion is somewhat more complicated.
Program planning, education, outreach, and surveillance are all reasonable
functions of a health department. They all are also feasible without the collection of
personally identifiable medical information.68 An example of program planning
might be deciding whether to fund a mobile van to offer voluntary cholesterol
screening in specific geographic areas. It would be helpful to know whether people
in that area would be interested in obtaining such screening. That information could
be obtained by surveying the population. It is not likely to be obtained from a
registry of blood sugar test results. Education programs might include distributing
brochures explaining diabetes, encouraging people to find out whether they have
diabetes, describing ways for diabetic patients to reduce their risk of disease, and
similar information.69 Such information could be provided by nurses or health
educators in willing clinics or even non-health care settings. Again, individually
identifiable A1C Registry data are not necessary to create such programs. Outreach

66. Therefore, unlike compulsory reporting of contagious diseases, the A1C registry appears to be
an unlikely and unnecessary means to prevent harm to the public. Kaveh G. Shojania et al., Effects of
Quality Improvement Strategies for Type 2 Diabetes on Glycemic Control: A Meta-Regression Analysis,
296 JAMA 427, 434 (2006) (finding that, by themselves, electronic patient registries were not associated
with reducing blood sugar levels in diabetic patients).
67. NOTICE OF ADOPTION, supra note 7, at 3.
68. The exception would be communicable disease surveillance to investigate a disease outbreak,
which, as discussed supra, is inapplicable to the A1C Registry.
69. E.g., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 57, at 798-99.
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activities often target educational programs or services for populations at risk. It is
helpful to know what populations are at risk, but it is hardly necessary to know
which individuals have high blood sugar. Indeed, people who have had an A1C test
are receiving medical care and should already know they are at risk. A more
effective form of outreach might be a program designed to educate physicians
about current best practices in caring for diabetic patients, such as synthesizing the
literature on effective ways to encourage patients to take better care of themselves,
or providing a list of support programs to which physicians could refer their
patients.70
Surveillance is an alternative, plausible reason for having an A1C Registry. In
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, disease surveillance consisted almost
entirely of case reporting for purposes of outbreak investigation.71 If limited to that
concept, it is subject to the objections set forth above and offers no independent
reason for compulsory reporting of identifiable blood sugar test results. In 1986, a
CDC note on an article about diabetes mortality stated:
The model surveillance system employed for infectious diseases, which
includes reporting and compiling cases at a central source and rapidly
disseminating results, is not currently a feasible approach for chronic
disease surveillance. Infectious disease control—the investigation of
causes and development of control strategies—is relatively
straightforward. Chronic disease surveillance and control are
comparatively more difficult because 1) chronic diseases are more
complicated to diagnose, 2) there are often multiple and poorly defined
etiologic factors for disease, and 3) there are long latency periods
between these factors and the onset of disease. In addition, the factors
responsible may be behaviors or practices (or neglect thereof) of
affected persons or health care providers.72
During the past two decades, however, the public health community has
expanded its view of disease surveillance to encompass the collection of
information about all kinds of diseases and conditions, including chronic diseases,
injuries, and even behaviors like tobacco and drug use.73 Instead of case reporting
or disease surveillance, most public health practitioners currently use the term

70. Medical specialty organizations do provide these kinds of information for physicians. E.g., Am.
Diabetes Ass’n, Professional Meetings/Education, http://www.diabetes.org/for-health-professionals-andscientists/profed.jsp (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
71. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
72. Premature Mortality from Diabetes, supra note 11, at 713.
73. Stephen B. Thacker, Historical Development, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
SURVEILLANCE 6 (Steven M. Teutsch & R. Elliott Churchill eds., 2d ed. 2000) (“Public health
surveillance information is used to assess public health status, define public health priorities, evaluate
programs, and conduct research.”). Many public health practitioners and scholars define surveillance so
broadly that it includes collecting information to be used in program planning, education, and outreach,
as well as outbreak investigation. E.g., id. at 8 tbl.1-1. Because those purposes are mentioned separately
in NOTICE OF ADOPTION, supra note 7, at 3, it is difficult to know exactly what New York City means
by surveillance in this context.
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“public health surveillance” or just “surveillance” to capture the broad range of
subject matter.74 In contrast to its earlier view, quoted above, the CDC now
strongly encourages states to collect data about cancer and other chronic diseases
and is the largest source of funding for surveillance programs in many states.75
The state’s police power undoubtedly includes the power to collect
anonymous statistical information about the types of diseases affecting its
population. Whether and when that power extends to collecting individually
identifiable information are separate questions. Counting the number of cases of a
disease can be done without collecting identifiable information, such as names and
addresses.76 Requiring names, addresses, and other individually identifiable data
simply to produce statistical summaries appears to violate the constitutional right to
information privacy.77 Even the American Diabetes Association, while agreeing

74. Nonetheless, public health scholars and practitioners still rely on Alexander Langmuir’s 1963
definition of disease surveillance as “‘the continued watchfulness over the distribution and trends of
incidence through the systematic collection, consolidation, and evaluation of morbidity and mortality
reports and other relevant data’ together with timely dissemination to those who ‘need to know. . . .’ [I]n
short, surveillance implied ‘information for action.’” (citations omitted). Berkelman et al., supra note
49, at 759.
75. See Cancer Registries Amendment Act, Pub. L. No. 102-515 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 280e(a) (2000 & Supp. III 2005)) (authorizing the CDC to fund the creation of cancer registries in
states where no NIH Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) cancer research program
exists). The availability of CDC funding encouraged states to create or expand cancer registries and, to
meet CDC funding guidelines, some states adopted laws requiring the reporting of cancer cases to the
registry. See also Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300ff-13 (2000 & Supp. III 2005) (allocating grant funding for HIV/AIDS treatment programs primarily
on the basis of the number of cases in the grantee’s state or city, which encouraged states to adopt
compulsory HIV reporting laws); INST. OF MED., MEASURING WHAT MATTERS: ALLOCATION,
PLANNING, AND QUALITY ASSESSMENT FOR THE RYAN WHITE CARE ACT 239-46 (2004).
76. Case reporting, with or without names, is one of several possible methods of collecting data on
the incidence or prevalence of disease. Other methods include sentinel surveys, sample surveys in which
a random or convenience sample of the relevant population is asked to participate in a survey, and
seroprevalence surveys, in which anonymous tissue or blood samples are tested for the presence of the
indicator of interest, such as HIV infection. Increasingly sophisticated epidemiological and statistical
methods offer new techniques for use in surveillance of all types. INST. OF MED., supra note 75, at 8083.
77. Tuscon Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 371 F.3d 1173, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Even if a law
adequately protects against public disclosure of a patient’s private information, it may still violate
informational privacy rights if an unbounded, large number of government employees have access to
the information.”); Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding an abortion reporting
law that prohibited reporting the patient’s’ name, but striking down reporting of a patient’s reasons for
not notifying her husband); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976) (noting that
abortion “[r]ecordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of
maternal health and that properly respect a patient’s confidentiality and privacy are permissible”). Birth,
death, and marriage registries can be justified on the ground that the individuals named in the documents
need state verification of their existence or status in order to qualify for certain rights or privileges. See
Berkelman et al., supra note 49, at 759 (“[H]ealth information systems (for example, registration of
births and deaths, routine abstraction of hospital records, health surveys in a population) that are general
and not linked to specific prevention and control programmes do not, by themselves, constitute
surveillance.”).
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that New York City’s A1C Registry could be valuable for both patients and
doctors, has noted that reporting should not be done without the patient’s consent.78
The CDC takes the position that, when the same person is reported more than
once over time or by multiple sources (as is usually the case), statistical summaries
of case reports cannot be entirely accurate unless names and other identifying
information are included.79 The identifying information allows the collecting
agency to recognize duplicate reports and count each person only once.80 The goal
of numerical precision, however valuable to statisticians, is not likely to outweigh a
person’s right to privacy of medical information. Moreover, there are other
statistical methods to de-duplicate case reports without using names. All methods,
including reporting with names, are subject to various errors that may make it
impossible to achieve 100% accuracy.81 Nonetheless, even accounting for slight
variations, they may be sufficiently accurate to achieve the purpose for which they
are collected.
C.

Creating a Registry for Research Studies

The New York City A1C Registry appears to be intended to intervene in the
care of an identifiable patient, not merely to collect statistics.82 However, mention
of purposes like program planning, education, and surveillance83 suggests that the
Health Department plans to use the data in the Registry for much more than
checking on medical care. One, if not the only, purpose is likely to be research.84
Since the Health Department will not use the A1C Registry to investigate any
communicable disease outbreak, does it use the term surveillance to mean research
with Registry data? In other words, when the Department says its purpose is to
conduct surveillance, does it really mean it will conduct research? If so, it is
difficult to defend the mandatory collection of individually identifiable
information.

78. David B. Caruso, New York Enacts Code to Keep Tabs on Diabetics, Blood Tests, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), Dec. 15, 2005, at 9A.
79. INST. OF MED., supra note 75, at 93.
80. Id.
81. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Guidelines for National Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Case Surveillance, Including Monitoring for Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 1920 (1999).
82. NOTICE OF ADOPTION, supra note 7, at 2. (“Evaluating [blood sugar] trends can be used to . . .
[d]irect more efficient interventions to health care institutions, health care providers and people with
diabetes.”) (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 3.
84. This possibility was heightened when the Health Department allowed patients to request that
the Department not contact the patient or send the patient’s blood sugar test results to the patient’s
physician. New York City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Diabetes Prevention and Control,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/diabetes/diabetes-nycar.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
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The use of personally identifiable data (medical or otherwise) in research
qualifies as using human subjects in research and therefore requires a subject’s
competent, voluntary, and informed prior consent to the use of his or her own
personally identifiable information.85 The State’s power to collect individually
identifiable medical information without consent for disease surveillance purposes
does not necessarily include the power to collect or use the information for
purposes of research.86 Certainly, collecting identifiable data without consent solely
for research studies would violate both the personal liberty and information privacy
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.87
Even accepting the dubious assertion that a health department has the
authority to compel the reporting of personally identifiable information for the
purpose of intervening in the person’s medical care, there remains the question of

85. The “Common Rule,” which governs federally funded research with “human subjects,” defines
a human subject to include “a living individual about whom an investigator . . . conducting research
obtains . . . [i]dentifiable private information.” E.g,, 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2005). For a review of the
case law governing informed consent to research with human subjects, see GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL.,
INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT’S DILEMMA 1-59 (1977); RUTH R.
FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 53-226 (1986),
WENDY K. MARINER, Human Subjects Research, Law, Common Law of Human Experimentation, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 654, 654-71 (Thomas H.
Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000) (reviewing the case law governing informed consent for
research with human subjects). The HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164, permits, but does
not require hospitals, physicians, and other covered entities to disclose personally identifiable
information without patient consent to public health authorities “for the purpose of preventing or
controlling disease, injury, or disability, including, but not limited to, the reporting of disease, injury . . .
and the conduct of public health surveillance, public health investigations, and public health
interventions.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i). Whether research is included within the meaning of these
purposes remains a matter of debate. This provision was not intended to and does not affect the validity
of state law governing reporting, research, or privacy. Standards for Individually Identifiable
Information, Background, 65 Fed. Reg. 82463, 86264 (2000) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160
& 164). See also NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, RESEARCH REPOSITORIES, DATABASES, AND THE HIPAA
PRIVACY
RULE
2
(2004),
available
at
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/research_repositories_final.pdf (explaining that the HIPAA
Privacy Rule does not govern health departments’ surveillance activities because such programs are not
covered entities within the meaning of the rule).
86. Most distinctions between medical research and practice rely on the principles of the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical Research. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE
PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT
REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
RESEARCH (1979), reprinted in NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS app. D at 161 (2001) (“‘[P]ractice’ refers to interventions
that are designed solely to enhance the well being of an individual patient or client and that have a
reasonable expectation of success . . . . By contrast, the term ‘research’ designates an activity designed
to test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge. . . .”).
87. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. State common law also recognizes a right of
privacy in personal medical information. See, e.g., Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 118-19 (1985)
(describing public policy basis for recognizing a physician’s duty not to disclose medical information
without patient’s consent). See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 345450 (2d ed. 2006).

2007]

MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH

141

whether it may use that same data in a research study. Whether data collected
legitimately for one purpose may be used for another purpose depends on an
independent justification for the second (or third or fourth) purpose. This is why
controversy remains over whether individuals who agree to participate in one
research study are entitled to allow researchers to use their identifiable information
in future unspecified research studies.88 The controversy is not over whether their
consent is required—all agree it is. Rather, there is disagreement over whether
consent can be given in advance or whether it must be given at the time the future
research is proposed, so that the person has knowledge of what she is agreeing to
and an opportunity to refuse.89
In the public health field, there is some uncertainty over what aspects of
surveillance and other public health programs qualify as research for which
individual consent is required.90 Since epidemiologists use many different methods
to study the distribution and causes of disease, it is not surprising that research
methods are sometimes conflated with non-research methods. Regardless of the
methodology used, the threshold question is whether a study constitutes research
with human subjects.91 Health departments often analyze surveillance data to
produce statistical summaries of the incidence and prevalence of specific diseases.
Such summaries are not strictly defined as regular surveillance activities because
they are not used to prevent or control disease.92 However, statistical summaries
that do not identify individuals rarely implicate individual privacy interests,
provided that the data were legitimately collected in the first place. Many other data
analyses, however, look more like traditional medical or social science research.
For example, an analysis of how many patients improve their A1C counts after
specific recommendations from their physicians mimics a typical research study of
the treatment outcomes, which would require the informed consent of the research
subjects whose identifiable information is used. More detailed analysis might
reveal that people with specific characteristics, such as gender, race, income, or
education, are more likely to lower their blood sugar than the general population.
Surveillance data can also be used to study disease etiology, risk factors associated

88. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, I RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 47-49, 62-66 (1999), available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/hbm.pdf (discussing both points of view on whether
consent can be given in advance or whether it must be given at the time the future research is proposed).
89. Id.
90. See Amy L. Fairchild, Dealing with Humpty Dumpty: Research, Practice, and the Ethics of
Public Health Surveillance, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 615, 618-20 (2003) (describing objections by some
CDC officials and the NYC Health Department to the NIH Office for the Protection from Research
Risks’s conclusion that analyses of surveillance data to produce generalizable knowledge were research
studies that had to comply with federal regulations governing human subject protection).
91. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2005). For example, reviewing anonymous statistical data is not research
with human subjects, while conducting a case-control study with individually identifiable information
qualifies as research. See id.
92. See Berkelman et al., supra note 49, at 759.
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with a disease, treatment efficacy, and similar subjects. Where identifiable
information is used, such analyses are indistinguishable from research studies that
require subject consent.
Public health agencies and their advocates sometimes take the position that
almost none of their uses of surveillance data should be considered research with
human subjects.93 Remarkably, this is usually presented as a conclusion without
any supporting argument or evidence.94 One observer familiar with research was
surprised to find that surveillance “was such a sacred cow” among many CDC
officials.95 A few commentators argue that studies with health data should not be
deemed to be research when they are conducted by a government agency, such as a
health department.96 Yet the notion that the legal requirements for research depend
on who conducts it is implausible on its face. The National Institutes of Health are
dedicated to conducting research and its investigators routinely seek subject
consent for research with human beings, including research using only individually
identifiable information.97 Health agencies do conduct research and are not immune
from the laws governing research when they do.98
Many state laws authorize health departments to conduct research.99 The mere
authorization delegates to the agency the power to conduct research, but, without
more, it does not automatically authorize the agency to conduct research with
human subjects without consent. Health departments generally recognize this.
Moreover, when contracting with outside universities or investigators, health
departments generally require those third parties to comply with requirements for
obtaining subject consent, as well as maintaining the confidentiality and security of
the information.

93. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2442 (McKinney 2002) (requiring voluntary informed consent
for human research). Another section provides that “[h]uman research shall not, however, be construed
to mean the conduct of biological studies exclusively utilizing tissue or fluids after their removal or
withdrawal from a human subject in the course of standard medical practice, or to include
epidemiological investigations.” Id. § 2441. The term “epidemiological investigations” is not defined. It
is not clear that this definition would withstand legal challenge. Moreover, the provisions of the New
York law expressly do not apply to research that is subject to federal regulations for the protection of
human subjects. Id. § 2445.
94. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Health Information Privacy and Public Health, 31 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 663, 663 (2003) (“Identifiable health data are the lifeblood of public health practice.”).
95. Fairchild, supra note 90, at 617.
96. Scott Burris et al., Applying the Common Rule to Public Health Agencies: Questions and
Tentative Answers About a Separate Regulatory Regime, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 638, 641-42 (2003)
(arguing that when the legislature enacts a law requiring the disclosure of information for research
purposes, the law should be deemed to be the community’s consent to research, dispensing with the need
for individual consent).
97. See, e.g., National Cancer Institute Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results (SEER)
Program, which conducts cancer surveillance using research methods, http://seer.cancer.gov.
98. See Thacker, supra note 73, at 6; NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 85, at 6-7.
99. E.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-a (McKinney 2002). Some states, such as New York,
expressly authorize newborn genetic screening programs to conduct research concerning whether new
tests are accurate and reliable and whether early intervention prevents disease. Id.
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Data collected by state and federal agencies offer researchers ready-made and
often free databases for various kinds of research.100 However, the existence of a
database or registry does not eliminate an individual’s right to decline to participate
in research. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the purpose for
which data is collected and rejected statutory interpretations that would give others
“an effort-free tool” to get information for different purposes.101 This suggests that
the Court would not agree with any interpretation of a statute authorizing the
collection of data for one purpose to be used by that agency or a third party for
different purposes without complying with any legal prerequisites that would exist
in the absence of the database. It also provides support for the conclusion that
researchers should not be able to use, for their own research, personally identifiable
information collected by a health department, or a federal agency, without the
informed consent of the individuals involved, because the researchers would need
informed consent to obtain the information in the absence of the database. The
database unfairly gives researchers “an effort-free tool” for their research.102
For these reasons, mandatory collection of identifiable A1C test results for a
registry cannot be justified if its sole purpose is to provide a database for research.
Moreover, even if the initial collection of the data were justifiable for a non-

100. See, e.g., Timothy Caulfield & Nola M. Ries, Consent, Privacy and Confidentiality in
Longitudinal, Population Health Research: The Canadian Legal Context, 12 HEALTH L.J. 1 (Supp.
2004) (exploring issues of consent, privacy, and confidentiality with respect to collection of biological
samples in databases for analysis); Barbara von Tigerstrom et al., Legal Regulation of Cancer
Surveillance: Canadian and International Perspectives, 8 HEALTH L.J. 1, 4-5 (2000) (arguing in favor
of increased cancer registries to facilitate research); Kenneth D. Mandl et al., Newborn Screening
Program Practices in the United States: Notification, Research, and Consent, 109 PEDIATRICS 269, 269
(2002) (describing newborn genetic screening databases); Jeffrey R. Botkin et al., Newborn Screening
Technology: Proceed With Caution, 117 PEDIATRICS 1793, 1797 (2006); ROBERT F. WEIR & ROBERT S.
OLICK, THE STORED TISSUE ISSUE: BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, ETHICS, AND LAW IN THE ERA OF GENETIC
MEDICINE 23-26 (2004) (discussing the availability of data about tissues in storage).
101. In Pierce County, Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146 (2003), a unanimous Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Thomas, interpreted a state statutory evidentiary privilege narrowly so as to avoid
allowing pre-trial discovery of data collected or compiled by state highway departments for the specific
purpose of applying for federal funds to remove highway hazards: “By amending the statute, Congress
wished to make clear that § 152 was not intended to be an effort-free tool in litigation against state and
local governments. . . . However, the text of § 409 evinces no intent to make plaintiffs worse off than
they would have been had § 152 funding never existed. Put differently, there is no reason to interpret §
409 as prohibiting the disclosure of information compiled or collected for purposes unrelated to § 152,
held by government agencies not involved in administering § 152, if, before § 152 was adopted,
plaintiffs would have been free to obtain such information from those very agencies.” (citations
omitted). See, e.g., Robertson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 954 F.2d 1433, 1435 (8th Cir. 1992) (recognizing
that § 409 was intended to “prohibit federally required record-keeping from being used as a ‘tool . . . in
private litigation’”).
102. Both surveillance databases and research using their data are encouraged by the availability of
federal funding and the fact that they offer an inexpensive source of data for researchers in an era of
reduced revenues for public health and medical research. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
New information technology makes it easier to link different databases to create new data sets. See U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RECORD LINKAGE AND PRIVACY: ISSUES IN CREATING NEW FEDERAL
RESEARCH AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION 14-15 (2001) (discussing the emergence of record linkage).
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research reason, the data could not be used without consent for subsequent research
studies. The legal basis for the A1C Registry rests on thin, if not ephemeral,
grounds. The next part of this article examines why the lack of a firm legal
rationale did not spur the Health Department to seek alternative ways to reduce the
toll of diabetes.
III. MEDICALIZATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH OR PUBLIC HEALTHIFICATION OF
MEDICINE?103
In 1958, historian George Rosen could still write, honestly, that “[p]rotection
of the community against communicable diseases and sanitation of the environment
have been and still are major aspects of the public health program.”104 By the end
of the twentieth century, however, chronic diseases had overtaken communicable
diseases as the leading causes of death. Even with the HIV/AIDS epidemic’s
enormous toll, the top three causes of death in the United States remain heart
disease, cancers, and stroke, which collectively kill more than 1,396,000 Americans
annually.105 Despite the publicity over possible avian influenza or bioterrorist
attacks, and although infectious diseases will undoubtedly always be public health
threats, rates of premature death in the United States are not likely to decline
significantly without a reduction in the age of onset of chronic diseases.106
Most people in public health today are keenly aware of the importance of
chronic diseases.107 Since public health measures its success in terms of reduced
death rates—mortality, usually from specific diseases—and reduced rates of illness
or disability—morbidity108—the public health community and health departments,
in particular, may be under pressure to demonstrate their continued value to the
state by reducing chronic disease death rates. Yet, chronic diseases can be much
more complicated to prevent and treat than infectious diseases. Chronic disease
treatments or interventions are primarily medical, as that term has been understood
traditionally—medications prescribed by physicians and nutrition and exercise
management in the case of diabetes. It may appear that if public health is to succeed
in reducing the rate of chronic diseases, it may have to adopt practices from the

103. Ilan H. Meyer & Sharon Schwartz, Editorial, Social Issues as Public Health: Promise and
Peril, 90 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1189, 1189 (2000).
104. GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 320 (expanded ed. 1993).
105. See Miniño et al., supra note 11, at 4 tbl.B.
106. Death rates overall will not decline, because everyone will die. The concern is with the number
and proportion of people who die before achieving a normal life expectancy, however “normal” may be
defined in statistical or philosophical terms.
107. Leslie M. Beitsch et al., Public Health at Center Stage: New Roles, Old Props, 25 HEALTH
AFF. 911, 912 (2006) (noting that “the burden placed on society by largely preventable chronic diseases
became more apparent” in the last half of the twentieth century when communicable diseases no longer
accounted for most deaths).
108. Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health: Beyond Emergency Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH
L. 247, 257 (2005) (arguing that public health measures its success in terms of population outcomes, not
processes, so that it “cannot account for individual values in the same manner as medicine”).
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medical profession. Whether public health officials should act like personal
physicians is a vexing question. More important, however, is the question whether,
unlike physicians, public health officials are empowered to use the force of law to
compel compliance with their recommendations.
The New York City A1C Registry is the most recent example of a public
health program expanding into the field of chronic diseases.109 Paradoxically, to
meet the modern challenge of chronic diseases, the Health Department advocates
case reporting—a technique developed more than a century ago to halt the spread
of contagious diseases. Diabetes, like other chronic diseases, is not contagious.110
The disease cannot be stopped by vaccinating people against diabetes or by
isolating them to prevent them from “infecting” other people with diabetes. Could
the Registry represent what has been called the “public healthification” of a
medical problem?111 Or, as another writer suggested in a letter critiquing a public
health study that attributed homelessness primarily to personal characteristics,
could it be that the “tools define the problem”?112 In this case, if what one does is
study case reports, then the problem is not enough case reports. Thus, if cases of

109. It also follows the reasoning laid out by Frieden in his published articles. See Thomas R.
Frieden et al., Applying Public Health Principles to the HIV Epidemic, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2397,
2400 (2005) (arguing for increased public health monitoring of HIV testing and treatment); Frieden,
supra note 54. This is not the first time that New Yorkers have resisted public health efforts to measure
and monitor their health. In 2004, for example, the Health Department tried to persuade a representative
sample of 2,000 city residents to participate in a survey of health status to create a health profile for the
City. Richard Pérez-Peña, For Health Survey, Many Offer More Excuses Than Details, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2004, at B1. Residents were approached at their apartments and asked to be measured for height,
weight, and blood pressure and to give blood to be tested for “sugar, tobacco smoke exposure,
pesticides, hepatitis C and herpes simplex virus, and poisons like lead, mercury, cadmium and arsenic.”
Id. One goal was to try to get a more accurate measure of obesity than may be obtained by telephone
interviews, where respondents may not be entirely honest. Id. The response rate was, perhaps
predictably, poor, especially in affluent neighborhoods. Id. In addition to individuals who refused to
participate, reasons for the lack of response included working people not at home and doormen refusing
entrance. Id. Some of those contacted participated out of a sense of altruism or the possibility of
obtaining a free clinic visit, while others refused because of uncertainty about the identity of the
canvassers, fear of having their personal information made available, or because they considered public
health projects to be for the poor. Id. In the case of blood sugar levels, the Department may have
believed that gaining direct access to medical test results would produce more information than could be
obtained by seeking voluntary cooperation from individual New Yorkers. Id. However, administrative
convenience alone has never been a sufficient reason to override personal privacy.
110. Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Diabetes Myths, http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-myths.jsp (last visited
Nov. 12, 2006). One can argue that, in affluent countries today, HIV infection is both an infectious
disease that can be transmitted to others and a chronic disease that, with appropriate treatment, can be
managed for a normal lifetime. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2003 – SHAPING
THE FUTURE, CHAPTER 3: HIV/AIDS: CONFRONTING A KILLER 43 (2003), available at
http://www.who.int/whr/2003/en/whr03_en.pdf.
111. Meyer & Schwartz, supra note 103, at 1189.
112. Benjamin E. Alexander-Eitzman, Editorial, Examining the Course of Homelessness: Right
Direction, Wrong Approach, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 764, 764 (2006) (referring to the axiom that if all
you have is a hammer, then every problem is a nail).
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communicable diseases become relatively rare, compared with cases of chronic
disease, then to remain viable, a reporting system needs to cover chronic diseases.
Health departments have policy options beyond reporting systems. The first is
a tried and true public health tool—education to alert people to a disease, its causes
and effects, and ways to prevent it, including encouraging people to get medical
care. The second is to offer the services of physicians to provide appropriate
medical care to those who cannot otherwise obtain it, which public health has often
done by funding physicians and other health care providers and clinics. The third is
to make eligibility for state benefits and services conditional upon meeting specific
health standards.113 The fourth is to obtain legislation or regulations that require
people to improve their health, perhaps by seeing a physician, taking medication, or
changing their unhealthful behaviors.
The New York City diabetes reporting program purports to take the second
approach, but may ultimately take the third or fourth.114 After all, the only law
needed for the first and second approaches are basic authorizations of power to
prepare educational materials and establish clinics and appropriations to fund those
activities, which should already exist. New law was needed to require clinical
laboratories to report personally identifiable information to the City Health
Department without the patient’s consent. New laws would also be needed to
implement the third and fourth approaches.
New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg endorsed his Health
Commissioner’s idea that chronic diseases are America’s biggest health threat in a
speech to a public health law conference sponsored by the CDC, by stating, “[n]ew
threats result from, and are aggravated by, our forbearance, and even social and

113. See,
e.g.,
West
Virginia
Medicaid
Member
Agreement,
http://www.wvdhhr.org/bms/oAdministration/bms_admin_WV_SPA06-02_20060503.pdf
(requiring
Medicaid beneficiaries to agree to certain conditions, including taking prescribed medications and
keeping appointments, to qualify for an “Enhanced Benefits Plan”). A variation on this option would be
to pay people to take better care of their health or imposing a tax on those who do not. Some private
employers use this approach by discounting employee group health insurance premiums for compliance
with wellness programs, which might also be viewed as imposing a surcharge on those who fail to
participate or meet target health goals. See Joanne Wojcik, Health Care Education Lacking at Work:
Study, BUS. INS., May 16, 2006, http://www.businessinsurance.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?newsID=7737.
Such programs are a small, but growing element of employee group health plans, typically offered to
reduce employer costs as well as prevent employee illness. Id. Employee responses to such programs
vary from appreciation for learning about how to prevent possible illness to fear of the loss of privacy or
even termination or retaliation for one’s medical condition. Barbara Rose, Firms Try to Predict Health
of Workers; Warding Off Employee Illnesses Cuts Costs, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 2005, at C1. States are
rarely capable of subsidizing their population for wellness and are more likely to use incentives and
penalties in programs like Medicaid. E.g., CTR. FOR MEDICAID AND STATE OPERATIONS, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., VALUE-BASED . . . RESULTS-DRIVEN . . . HEALTHCARE: THE
MEDICAID/SCHIP
QUALITY
INITIATIVE,
1
(2005)
available
at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidSCHIPQualPrac/Downloads/qualitystrategy.pdf; Speaker Judith E.
Fradkin, The Medicaid Buy-In Program: Lessons Learned From Nine “Early Implementer” States,
Summary Minutes of the Diabetes Mellitus Interagency Coordinating Committee (DMICC) Meeting on
Apr. 11, 2003, available at http://www.niddk.nih.gov/federal/dmicc/Final-April-11-Summary.pdf.
114. NOTICE OF ADOPTION, supra note 7, at 2.
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economic encouragement, of such behavior as tobacco addiction, unhealthy
nutrition and excessively sedentary lifestyles.”115 Mayor Bloomberg also
encouraged the, “forceful application of law . . . as the principal instrument of our
public health policy.”116 Law has always been an effective tool to implement public
health policy. Laws governing sewerage, food, drugs, and vaccinations have helped
prevent the spread of contagious diseases.117 Yet, where the state overrides an
individual’s right to information privacy, it requires specific justification beyond
general appeals to improve health.118
The New York City Health Department may rely on just such general appeals
to public health found in the handful of court decisions upholding reporting laws.119
A full explanation of why these decisions provide a shaky foundation for the
diabetes and similar reporting laws is beyond the scope of this article.120 For
purposes of this discussion, three points are most important. First, the
constitutionality of mandatory reporting laws has not been rigorously examined for
decades. Only a few cases since the 1970s have considered any reporting law.
These have upheld laws requiring the reporting of prescriptions for controlled
substances,121 performance of abortions,122 test results for HIV/AIDS, a contagious
disease,123 and newborn genetic testing for conditions that require immediate
treatment to prevent severe disabilities.124 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals’s
1980 statement remains true today: “Generally, the reporting requirements which
have been upheld have been those in which the government has advanced a need to
acquire the information to develop treatment programs or control threats to public

115. Diane Cardwell, Laws Can Be Good for You, Mayor Tells Health Officials, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2006, at B3.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 58 and 61 and accompanying text.
120. I develop that argument in a forthcoming article in B.U. L. REV.
121. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977).
122. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900-01 (1992); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80-81 (1976). But see Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-67 (1986) (striking down a Pennsylvania abortion reporting law). See
supra note 58.
123. See Middlebrooks v. State Bd. of Health, 710 So. 2d 891, 892-93 (Ala. 1998) (upholding an
action to compel physician to provide names and addresses of his patients with HIV/AIDS as required
by Alabama’s reporting statute); ACT-UP Triangle v. Comm’n for Health Services of N.C., 483 S.E.2d
388, 393 (N.C. 1997) (upholding the health department’s decision to end anonymous HIV testing by
local health departments, without addressing the validity of the reporting law); N.Y. State Soc’y of
Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 610 (N.Y. 1991) (upholding state health commissioner’s
discretion to refuse to require HIV reporting).
124. Douglas County v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Neb. 2005) (denying parents’ claim that
statute requiring newborns to be tested for several genetic conditions violated their First Amendment
right to freedom of religion and Fourteenth Amendment right to raise their child because, under rational
basis review, the state had “an interest in the health and welfare of all children born in Nebraska” and
the testing could identify a condition leading to mental retardation or other severe disability that could
be prevented with immediate treatment).
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health.”125 However, the United States Supreme Court has not reviewed a disease
reporting law. The reasoning supporting these decisions does not encompass the
mandatory reporting of personally identifiable information about patients with
chronic disease conditions, because there is neither a threat to others nor any
immediate need for treating a child.126
A second reason to be wary of these decisions is that the courts use very
general language to describe the law’s goal and offer little explanation of their
reasoning. The few state court decisions on disease reporting simply note that the
reporting information is sought to prevent or control disease, perhaps because the
courts view the threat as obvious. The absence of language explaining why one
disease or condition differs from any other makes it difficult to determine the limits
of any principle being applied.127 The most logical limit comes from the facts of the
case, specifically the threat to the public posed by the condition to be reported and
the utility of identifiable information in investigating that threat. However one
interprets these decisions, it is difficult to extend their reasoning to uphold
mandatory reporting of chronic disease indicators for identifiable individuals.
All reporting laws—perhaps all laws—have some ultimate goal to protect
public health or welfare.128 But, as the United States Supreme Court observed, if

125. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
126. For example, tests for genetic and metabolic conditions for which there is no treatment or which
can be treated later in life if symptoms arise are difficult to justify on parens patriae grounds, because
they offer no immediate benefit to the newborn. See Sheila Wildeman & Jocelyn Downie, Genetic and
Metabolic Screening of Newborns: Must Healthcare Providers Seek Explicit Parental Consent?, 9
HEALTH L.J. 61, 63 (2001) (arguing that consent is required for genetic testing); Botkin et al., supra note
100, at 1795 (noting that because some “conditions . . . are only marginally treatable or untreatable,”
newborn screening programs may “produce more harm than benefit” for the children screened).
127. However, the abortion reporting cases do provide some analysis of when the threat to privacy is
significant enough to preclude reporting without consent. Where the disclosure of information also
impinges on other rights or personal autonomy, courts scrutinize the justification for disclosure more
carefully. See cases cited supra note 122; see also Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th
Cir. 1995) (concluding that disclosure by the state of sex or health information, which is the type of
information in which “an individual has a legitimate expectation or confidentiality,” requires strict
scrutiny); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987)
(“Most circuits appear to apply an ‘intermediate standard of review’ for the majority of confidentiality
violations . . . with a compelling interest analysis reserved for ‘severe intrusions’ on confidentiality”
(citing Barry v. City of N.Y., 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d. Cir. 1983); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726
F.2d 459, 469 (9th Cir. 1983))). Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597-98, 606 (1977) (finding that a law
requiring the submission of copies of prescriptions for controlled substances to the health department
was a “rational legislative decision” based on the reasonable assumption that patient identification could
help to deter, detect, or investigate criminal drug diversion, and therefore did not invade “any right or
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment” without expressly stating which standard of review it
applied).
128. See, e.g., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIPAA Privacy Rule and Public Health:
Guidance from CDC and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 52 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 10 (Supp. 2003). The CDC used the this type of reasoning to characterize
surveillance as practice rather than research: “The majority of public health activities (e.g., public health
surveillance, and disease prevention and control projects) are based on scientific evidence and data
collection or analytic methods similar to those used in research. However, they are not designed to
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one looked to the ultimate purpose of a law, anything might be justified.129 This is
why it is essential to judge the law by its immediate or primary operation and
effect. For example, biomedical research ultimately serves the worthy public
purpose of preventing or perhaps curing disease, but this does not mean that a
research study need not obtain subject consent. Yet, under the reasoning offered to
justify the diabetes reporting program, individuals could be compelled to provide
personal information for a research study simply because it may ultimately serve
the public good.130
Finally, the decisions upholding mandatory reporting emphasize the need to
maintain the confidentiality of personally identifiable information within the
agency that first collects it, including provisions for keeping the data secure and
penalties for unauthorized disclosure.131 However, the requirements for
confidentiality and security are in addition to, not instead of, the government’s
obligation to prove that requiring personally identifiable information is at least a
rational means of achieving a legitimate state interest. The Health Department and
a few commentators may assume that mandatory reporting is acceptable as long as
personally identifiable data is kept secure and confidential within the Health
Department. That assumption amounts to a claim that confidentiality is not merely
necessary but also sufficient to override an individual’s right to information
privacy. No court has expressly adopted that standard. Moreover, it offers no
limiting principle by which to judge the state’s power to compel information
disclosure. Rather, it would allow the state to compel anyone to reveal personally
identifiable medical information whenever it might be of any potential use in
improving medical care, making policy decisions, evaluating budgets, or
conducting research—as long as the agency collecting the data kept the data for its

contribute to generalizable knowledge. Their primary purpose is to protect the health of the population
through such activities as disease surveillance, prevention, or control.” Id. Since practice is for the
benefit of a particular patient, the CDC went on to assert that “[p]ublic health practice activities (e.g.,
public health surveillance, disease control, or program evaluation) are undertaken with the intent to
benefit a specific community, although occasionally they may provide unintended generalizable benefits
to others.” Id.
129. Ferguson v. City of Charlestown, 532 U.S. 67, 84-85 (2001) (explaining that a reporting
program in which a hospital provided law enforcement with the results of unconsented to drug tests by
pregnant women could not be justified by the program’s ultimate goal “[b]ecause law enforcement
involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objective,” and that such a program must
instead be justified by its “specific” or “immediate” purpose).
130. NOTICE OF ADOPTION, supra note 7. The NYC Health Department has used the diabetes model
to propose additional reporting for HIV cases for the purpose of monitoring their medical care. “An Act
to amend the public health law, in relation to the improvement of care and treatment of persons with the
human immunodeficiency virus.” (copy on file with author); see Frieden et al., supra note 109, at 240001 (arguing that the Health Department should monitor HIV treatment and case management). The HIV
proposal engendered more vocal criticism than the diabetes registry, perhaps because the HIV/AIDS
community is better organized than patients with Type 2 diabetes, and remains a proposal as of
December 4, 2006.
131. Whalen v. Roe , 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977); Middlebrooks v. State Bd. of Health, 710 So. 2d
891, 893 (Ala. 1998).

150

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 10:121

own use. That is no limit at all. It is, in essence, a repudiation of the right to
information privacy.
Vague principles create the risk that they will be applied selectively to those
who are disadvantaged or least able to protest. As Justice Jackson said, “nothing
opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow . . . officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the
political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were
affected.”132 The A1C Registry affects people with diabetes who are
disproportionately from low-income and minority populations in New York City.133
Moreover, the individuals who are reported are most likely to have Type 2
diabetes,134 which is often perceived as a self-inflicted problem among the elderly
who are sedentary and obese.135 Although individuals with diabetes certainly

132. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
133. See National Diabetes Information Clearinghouse (NDIC), National Diabetes Statistics,
http://diabetes.niddk.nih.gov/dm/pubs/statistics/index.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) (noting that in
2005, the total prevalence of diabetes was measured by race/ethnicity and adjusted for age.
Hispanic/Latino Americans are “1.7 times as likely to have diabetes as non-Hispanic whites.” In
addition, non-Hispanic blacks are “1.8 times as likely to have diabetes as non-Hispanic whites of similar
age.”); Michael P. Stern & Braxton D. Mitchell, Diabetes in Hispanic Americans, in DIABETES IN
AMERICA
631,
631,
635
(2d
ed.
1995),
available
at
http://diabetes.niddk.nih.gov/dm/pubs/america/pdf/chapter32.pdf (noting that four large studies, one of
which included information on Puerto Ricans in the New York City area, have “clearly established that
the prevalence of non-insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus (NIDDM) is two to three times higher in
Mexican Americans than in non-Hispanic whites.”). In addition, NIDDM also affects a disproportionate
number of low-income families. In a San Antonio Heart Study, “[s]ubjects were sampled from three
types of neighborhoods: low-income barrios, middle-income transitional neighborhoods, and highincome suburbs. In Mexican Americans, NIDDM prevalence was two to four times higher in the barrio
than in the suburban neighborhoods.” Id. at 633; see also Eugene S. Tull & Jeffrey M. Roseman,
Diabetes in African Americans, in DIABETES IN AMERICA 613, 619-20 (2d ed. 1995), available at
http://diabetes.niddk.nih.gov/dm/pubs/america/pdf/chapter31.pdf (“In the United States, an inverse
relationship has been noted for socioeconomic status (education and income) and the prevalence of
diabetes in adults for both black and white Americans. Data from the NHIS show that for both black and
white Americans diabetes frequency decreases with increasing level of education and family income.”).
134. Fact Sheet No. 312, supra note 2.
135. E.g., Urbina, supra note 22, at A1 (“Epidemiologists say the disparity [in funding for cancer as
compared to diabetes] is partly explained by lingering but outdated perceptions of diabetes as a slowmoving condition that preys on the old and obese . . . .”); Thomas Flower, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 2006, at 13 (“It has been clearly established that Type 2 diabetes is a lifestyle disease.”). Public
sympathy is more likely to favor children with Type 1 diabetes. Id.; Juvenile Diabetes Research
Foundation International, Life with Type 1 Diabetes, http://www.jdrf.org/index.cfm?page_id=103431
(last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (advocating for research and support for Type 1 diabetes). Type 1 diabetes
also received most NIH funded diabetes research funding. E.g., Nat’l Inst. of Diabetes & Digestive &
Kidney Diseases, Help Wanted: Pediatric Endocrinologists; Funding Will Help Train Researchers in
Childhood Diabetes (Jan. 29, 2003), available at http://www.niddk.nih.gov/welcome/releases/1-2903.htm; Diabetes Mellitus Interagency Coordinating Comm. (DMICC) Meeting Reports, Opportunities
for Research to Develop New Therapies for Vascular Complications of Diabetes (Apr. 11, 2003),
available at http://www.niddk.nih.gov/federal/dmicc/meetings.htm; Nat’l Inst. of Diabetes & Digestive
& Kidney Diseases, Executive Summary: Report on Progress and Opportunities 5 (2003), available at
http://www.niddk.nih.gov/federal/planning/type1_specialfund/execsumm.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2006);
Griffin Rodgers, Report from the NIDDK Deputy Director, Meeting Minutes for the Department of
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deserve help, it is worth asking whether the Registry offers the help they want.
Finally, it is troubling that this help is not being offered in the form of more
accessible voluntary services, but at the cost of their information privacy.
CONCLUSION
The New York City A1C Registry is an example of public health stretching
its mandate into the field of medical care and chronic diseases. The impact of
chronic disease on public health has encouraged public health agencies to create
new programs to meet twenty-first century needs. There is some irony, therefore,
that among the many ways in which health departments might help people with
diabetes, an old-fashioned mandatory reporting system was chosen. Created with
the best of motives to reduce disability among diabetic patients, the Registry rests
on the assumption that individuals have no right to control the use of their personal
medical information and risks causing permanent damage to the right to
information privacy and perhaps even patient autonomy. The limitless nature of the
apparent principle underlying the A1C Registry transforms a well-intentioned
program to improve health into a threat to personal liberty.

Health and Human Services, Public Health Services, National Institutes of Health, National Diabetes
and Digestive and Kidney Diseases Advisory Council on Feb. 23-24, 2005, available at
http://www.niddk.nih.gov/fund/divisions/dea/council/minutes/Feb23-24-05.pdf (noting that the “NIDDK
appropriation is approximately $1.713 billion (up from about $1,665 billion in FY04)—excluding a
special funding program for type 1 diabetes research, which the NIDDK manages on behalf of the
Department.”). Federal funding for Type 2 prevention comes mostly from the CDC and totals about onesixth of NIH diabetes funding. Ian Urbina, Funds Lag as Diabetes Cases Soar, DESERET MORNING
NEWS, May 16, 2006, at A02. The American Diabetes Association covers all types of diabetes, but is
best known for its concern for Type 2 diabetes. See Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Diabetes Prevention,
http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-prevention.jsp (last visited Nov. 2, 2006).

